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Abstract:
Throughout the Obama Administration, state attorneys general (AGs)
have collaborated on several high-profile political issues. To get a fuller
picture of this contemporary AG activism, this article analyzes AG
participation in lawsuits and amicus curiae briefs before the U.S. Supreme
Court across three presidential administrations. The results suggest that AGs'
agendas have increasingly diverged throughout the Obama Administration,
reflecting greater vertical conflict between AGs and the federal government as
well as horizontal conflict among AGs themselves. Several factors have
contributed to this development, including the broader polarization of
American politics, intensified activism among Republican AGs, and increased
collaborations between AGs and ideological interest groups. Much as with
partisan contestation in other venues, these AG conflicts show few signs of
abating.

Since President Obama took office in 2009, state attorneys
general (AGs) have been among the administration's most persistent
foes. Most famously, several AGs initiated legal challenges to the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) only minutes after
the president signed it into law, an effort that led to the Supreme
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Court limiting the ACA's Medicaid expansion (National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius [2012]). The ACA litigation was the
most prominent state legal challenge to the Obama Administration, but
it has been far from the only one. By the end of Obama's first term in
office, Republican AGs had filed over seventy lawsuits challenging the
administration's policies. Texas AG Greg Abbott, who only half-jokingly
described his average day as "I go to the office. I sue the federal
government. And then I go home," has himself led twenty-four
lawsuits against the Obama Administration at a cost of over $2.5
million and thousands of hours of staff time (Monro 2012; Weissert
2012; Fernandez 2013). Meanwhile, the federal Department of Justice
has tangled with its state counterparts in a series of lawsuits involving
immigration policy and voting rights, and partisan AG coalitions have
been involved in several high-profile lawsuits pertaining to politically
controversial issues, including same-sex marriage, gun control, and
abortion.
These activities are of interest to federalism scholars because
AGs' position in state government grants them an important avenue
through which to influence national policy. Most AGs have considerable
autonomy when it comes to developing their state's official position in
litigation, which includes participation as both direct parties and as
amicus curiae ("friends of the court"). Further, forty-three of the
nation's AGs are elected statewide separately from the governor or
other state elected offices, empowering most of them with
considerable political independence.1 AGs have taken advantage of this
institutional autonomy to become involved in several high-profile legal
and political issues. As the ACA litigation illustrated, these activities
can be a powerful form of "bottom-up federalism" that acts as a form
of pushback on the federal government (Gamkhar and Pickerill 2012).
Relying upon an analysis of an original dataset of AG activity in
the U.S. Supreme Court, this article examines trends in contemporary
AG activism. Specifically, I examine AGs' participation in lawsuits and
on amicus brief filings in the Supreme Court from 1993 to 2013 to
determine the extent of AG conflict and cooperation during the Obama
Administration and the two preceding presidential administrations. This
examination suggests that AG activity during the Obama
Administration has become increasingly polarized, resulting in greater
vertical conflict between the states and federal government as well as
horizontal conflicts among the AGs themselves. While bipartisan
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collaboration still occurs on some issues, Democratic and Republican
AGs are pursing increasingly divergent agendas across a wide range of
policy domains.
The article proceeds as follows. I begin with a discussion of AGs
and contemporary federalism, raising the question of how broader
trends in American federalism might have affected the activities of the
AGs. I then examine an original dataset of AG activism across three
presidential administrations, finding a sharp increase in both vertical
and horizontal conflicts during the Obama Administration. Third, I take
a closer look at specific areas of AG conflict and cooperation since
2009. In this section, I identify two key trends in state litigation: a
dramatic increase in Republican AG activism as compared to the last
Democratic presidential administration and increasing divergence in
the ways AGs define the "state interests" they are tasked with
representing. The fourth section suggests that the intensification of AG
partisanship has several sources, including the broader polarization of
the political system, the significant increase in both the quantity of and
activism among Republican AGs, and increased collaborations between
AGs and ideological interest groups. I conclude with suggestions about
possible future research on contemporary AG activism.

Contemporary Federalism, Polarization, and State
Attorneys General
Contemporary American federalism has been described as
"more chaotic, complex, and contentious than ever before" (Bowling
and Pickerill 2013: 315). States have resorted to several methods to
complicate and push back against federal policy, including turning
down federal grants (Nicholson-Crotty 2012), refusing to implement
elements of "cooperative" federal programs such as Medicaid
(Tavernise and Gebeloff 2013), and even threatening to nullify federal
law (Schwartz 2013).
At the heart of what Bowling and Pickerill (2013) call
“fragmented federalism" is an intensification of partisanship and
polarization throughout the entire American political system. Members
of Congress are as polarized now as they have ever been in American
history, and issue differences between Democratic and Republican
voters are at all-time highs (Pew Research Center 2012). While until
quite recently state politics was viewed as being more conducive to
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compromise and bipartisanship (Krane 2007; Brownstein and
Czekalinski 2013), state-level polarization has become much stronger.
Following the 2012 elections, one party held the governorship and
both chambers of the legislature in thirty-seven states, a marked
departure from previous patterns of divided government (Balz 2013).
This unified governance has enabled states to pursue widely divergent
agendas on a host of issues.
To what extent has this increased partisanship affected recent
activities of AGs? On the one hand, it would appear that increased
cohesion, rather than divergence, best describes contemporary AG
activism. Beginning during the last two decades of the twentieth
century, AGs increasingly coordinated across state lines to intervene in
national politics. Several scholars have examined multistate
collaboration in the Supreme Court, where states have become the
second most active litigator after the federal government (Mather
2003; Lindquist and Corley 2013). AGs also became active in filing
multistate amicus curiae briefs on behalf of their states (Provost 2011;
Waltenburg and Swinford 1999; Kearney and Merrill 2000; NicholsonCrotty 2007). Further, as Colin Provost has documented, AGs have
actively coordinated their efforts to bring consumer protection lawsuits
against prominent national corporations (Provost 2003; Provost 2006).
In February 2012, for example, all of the nation's AGs signed a $26
billion agreement with the six largest national banks, concluding their
investigation of the mortgage crisis of the late 2000s (Schwartz and
Dewan 2012).
On the other hand, contemporary AG activities appear to reflect
fragmented federalism in several key ways. First, AGs have engaged in
a considerable amount of vertical conflict by challenging the federal
government and pursuing policy goals opposite to those sought by
their federal counterparts in the Department of Justice. The use of
judicial avenues to challenge the federal government is nothing new,2
but AGs became more willing to coordinate their challenges against
federal policy during the Reagan Administration (Clayton 1994). AGs
became especially active during the George W. Bush Administration,
when several criticized "regulatory gaps" in the Bush Administration's
approach to prescription drug regulation, antitrust enforcement,
financial regulation, and prevention of climate change. In addition to
using settlements with national industries to help fill these alleged
"regulatory gaps," AGs also sued federal agencies in attempts to force
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them to take a stronger regulatory approach (Scheberle 2005). This
vertical conflict has been very much present during the Obama
Administration, perhaps best exemplified by AG-led lawsuits
challenging the Affordable Care Act.
Also important have been two forms of horizontal conflict
involving disputes among the AGs themselves. First, AGs have
sometimes opposed one another directly in court. This can occur when
policy choices in some states produce spillover effects affecting the
interests of other states (Zimmerman 2011) or when AGs otherwise
disagree with one another about the proper outcome of a legal
dispute. Second, partisanship can generate additional conflict among
AGs. In addition to most AGs having independence from other statelevel political actors, all of them are either members of the Democratic
or Republican Party. As other scholars have demonstrated, this
partisanship can be an important part of AG decision-making (Spill,
Licari, and Ray 2001; Provost 2011).

State Litigation across Three Presidential
Administrations
Previous scholarship on AGs describes these actors as taking on
more activist roles over time, but have any new trends in AG activism
emerged during the Obama Administration? To help identify possible
trends in AG conflict and cooperation, I examined multistate AG
activism in the U.S. Supreme Court across the three most recent
presidential administrations. While participation in lawsuits before the
nation's highest court is only one of several forms of contemporary AG
activism,3 it is one of the most important ways in which AGs seek to
have a national impact on public policy. This participation primarily
occurs in one of two ways: either as direct litigants or as amicus
curiae. Both of these avenues allow AGs to determine the official
position of their states in what are often high profile legal and political
disputes.
My data collection included all cases from 1993 to 2013 in which
multiple AGs filed a brief to the U.S. Supreme Court as either direct
litigants or amici.4 This included AG participation during both the
certiorari and merits stages of a case. To collect this data, I employed
a search of the U.S. Supreme Court Briefs database available through
Lexis-Nexis.5 Because my interest is in the number of cases involving
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AG participation rather than the sheer number of AG briefs filed, I
counted multiple briefs filed in one case only once for the purpose of
this analysis. Therefore, cases in which states first filed a brief at the
certiorari stage and again during the merits stage were counted only
once.6 This search resulted in 845 Supreme Court cases from 1993
through 2013 attracting multistate AG participation.7
After identifying each of the cases, I then determined whether
each case involved vertical conflicts (between the states and federal
government) or horizontal conflicts (among the states themselves).
Cases were coded as involving vertical conflicts if the federal
government, typically through the Department of Justice, participated
in the case by opposing the interests of any of the AGs involved. I also
determined the prevalence of two types of horizontal conflicts among
AGs. The first were cases in which groups of AGs engaged in direct
conflict by taking opposing positions in the case. The second group of
cases included those that, while not involving direct conflicts among
AGs, involved clear partisan behavior by either Republican or
Democratic AGs. For the purposes of this analysis, I considered AG
briefs "partisan" in nature if Republican or Democratic AGs constituted
at least 80 percent of the AGs participating in the brief.8
The results suggest a strong upward trend in both vertical and
horizontal conflict during the Obama Administration. Figure 1
illustrates the number of cases involving vertical conflict between AGs
and the federal government. Figure 2 includes the number of
horizontal conflicts in which AGs either opposed one another directly or
collaborated only on partisan briefs.
[Figure 1 here]
[Figure 2 here]
The large spike in these conflicts during 2013 reflects that many of the
cases that had been percolating in the lower courts finally reached the
Supreme Court during this year. Overall, AGs opposed the federal
government's position in fifty-nine Supreme Court cases from 2009
through 2013, which already nearly surpasses the number of such
cases during the entire Clinton Administration and is likely to soon
exceed the total number during the George W. Bush years.9 Similarly,
horizontal conflicts among AGs have also intensified. Seventy-five
cases have involved partisan participation among AGs during the
Obama Administration, and AGs have directly opposed each other in
twenty-one cases during this time. Both of these totals already surpass
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the totals for the eight years of the Clinton presidency and are close to
the totals for the entire George W. Bush Administration.10

AG Conflicts and Cooperation during the Obama
Administration
Which issues have generated the most intergovernmental
conflict and which areas still generate cooperation among the AGs? To
help answer this question, I categorized the cases in the dataset based
on the nature of the conflicts involved. The most contentious set of
cases were those involving both vertical and horizontal conflicts,
indicating divisions between AGs and the federal government as well
as among AGs themselves. Other cases involved only one type of
conflict: either horizontal conflicts among AGs in cases not involving
the federal government or vertical conflicts in which states provided a
united front in opposition to the federal government. A final category
of cases involved cooperation rather than conflict, including cases in
which AGs formed bipartisan coalitions on a single side of the case.
Many of these cases also involved AG cooperation with the federal
Department of Justice.
Table 1 indicates the frequency of each of these four groups of
cases during the Obama Administration.
[Table 1 here]
Below, I provide a brief overview of the sorts of issues involved
in each of the four basic forms of conflict and cooperation represented
in Table 1. To assist in this effort, I turned to the U.S. Supreme Court
database to collect information about the types of issues involved in
each of the 845 cases in the dataset.11

Areas Involving both Vertical and Horizontal Conflicts
The greatest amount of intergovernmental conflict occurs when
divisions exist both between the states and the federal government as
well as among the states themselves. This category of cases has
grown considerably over time. About 18 percent of all Supreme Court
cases attracting AG participation during the Obama Administration fell
into this category, as compared to only 6 percent during the Clinton
Administration and 12 percent during the George W. Bush
Administration. Further, this category described over 37 percent of the
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cases in 2013. These cases have tended to involve partisan conflict
over federal statutes and regulations, though they have also involved
constitutional disputes concerning controversial state laws.
The most prominent of the cases in this category occurring
during the Obama Administration have involved the Affordable Care
Act. An all-Republican coalition of AGs initiated the challenges to both
the Medicaid expansion and the individual mandate provisions of the
ACA that ultimately led to NFIB v. Sebelius (2012). Another allDemocratic coalition of AGs opposed these efforts by filing amicus
briefs in support of these ACA provisions. Private party challenges to
the ACA's contraceptives mandate likewise attracted partisan AG
amicus participation on both sides of the issue (Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius [cert. granted]; Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby
Stores [cert. granted]).
Environmental policy, particularly concerning air pollution
regulation, has also generated considerable vertical and horizontal
conflict since 2009. Much of the litigation has focused on the
regulatory fallout from the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts
v. Environmental Protection Agency (2007) and subsequent Obama
Administration actions to combat climate change. When the EPA
announced in December 2009 that carbon dioxide was a pollutant that
endangered human health, several Republican AGs filed suit to
overturn the finding (Tresaugue 2010; Cook 2010). This spurred
sixteen other AGs, all but one Democrats, to intervene in these cases
on behalf of the Obama EPA's position and against their Republican AG
counterparts (Massachusetts Attorney General's Office 2010). The
EPA's subsequent attempts to implement climate change regulation
have also featured sharp conflicts among Democratic and Republican
AGs (Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA [cert. granted]). Cases
involving environmental issues other than climate change have
likewise generated both vertical and horizontal conflicts, including acid
rain control (EPA v. EME Homer City Generation [cert. granted]),
regulation under the Clean Water Act (Sackett v. EPA [2012]; Mingo
Logan Coal Co. v. EPA [cert. petition pending]), forest conservation
(Wyoming v. U.S. Dept of Agriculture [cert. denied]), and federal
approval of increased ethanol blending in gasoline (Grocery
Manufacturers' Association v. EPA [cert. denied]).
Several high profile disputes over controversial social issues also
fall into this category of intense intergovernmental conflict. Partisan
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coalitions of Republican AGs have opposed the Obama Administration's
position in cases involving gay rights (Hollingsworth v. Perry [2013];
United States v. Windsor [2013]), immigration (Arizona v. United
States [2012]), gun control (Abramski v. United States [cert.
granted]; Montana Shooting Sports Association v. Holder [cert.
denied]), buffer zones around abortion clinics (McCullen v. Coakley
[cert. granted]), and voting rights (Shelby County v. Holder [2013];
Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona [2013]). Several of these
cases have prompted partisan coalitions of Democratic AGs to countermobilize in opposition to their Republican colleagues.

Areas Involving Only Horizontal Conflict
Another set of cases, while not involving the federal
government, has nevertheless generated significant horizontal conflict
among the AGs. These cases, representing 17 percent of all cases
attracting AG involvement during the Obama Administration, tend to
involve the constitutionality of highly contentious state laws.
Affirmative action policies provide one prominent example. Partisan
groups of AGs filed opposing briefs in a case involving whether
Michigan's state constitutional ban of affirmative action violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Schuette v. Coalition
to Defend Affirmative Action [cert. granted]). In Fisher v. University of
Texas (2013), a group of nearly all Democratic AGs filed a brief in
favor of the constitutionality of the university's affirmative action
program, which followed Republican Texas AG Greg Abbott's refusal to
defend the university's race-conscious program in the Supreme Court
(Von Spakovsky 2013). Sharp horizontal conflicts have also been
prominent in cases concerning other hot-button issues such as gun
control (McDonald v. Chicago [2012]), abortion (Horne v. Isaacson
[cert. denied]), and religion (Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
[2010]; Salazar v. Buono [2010]; Town of Greece v. Galloway [cert.
granted]).
This category of cases has also involved AG disagreement on
issues pertaining to class actions and private litigants' access to the
courts. Two of the most important class action cases in recent years
both featured partisan groups of AGs taking opposing positions in the
litigation. In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles (2013), which
dealt with the right of a company sued by class action litigants to
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remove the case from state to federal court, an all-Republican AG
coalition filed an amicus brief in favor of the company, raising concerns
about "the use of novel class-action procedures to abridge the rights of
their citizens" (Brief of Alabama, et al. 2012). Meanwhile, three
Democratic AGs filed a brief on the opposing side, arguing that
removing the class action to federal court would harm "the ability of
their citizens to adjudicate controversies within their own jurisdiction"
(Brief of Arkansas, et al. 2012). Similarly, partisan groups of AGs took
opposing positions in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (2011), which
involved whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempted state contract
law prohibiting the use of certain arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts.

Areas Involving Only Vertical Conflict
A third category of cases involves those in which states present
a united front in opposition to the federal government. While this type
of case may be the first to come to mind when discussing
intergovernmental conflicts, they in fact constitute a small and
shrinking percentage of intergovernmental conflict. This category
represented about 15 percent of all cases in the dataset during the
Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations, but described only 9
percent of the cases during the first five years of the Obama
Administration. Especially common in this grouping of cases were
those involving federal preemption and sovereign immunity.
In National Meat Association v. Harris (2012), for example, a
bipartisan AG coalition joined with California AG Kamala Harris in
defending a state law regulating the treatment of animals in
slaughterhouses. The Obama Administration opposed the states'
position, arguing that the Federal Meat Inspection Act expressly
preempted California's law. Other preemption cases have also involved
bipartisan AG coalitions opposing the federal government's position
(Wos v. E.M.A. [2013]; Montana v. U.S. Department of the Treasury
[cert. denied]). Sovereign immunity cases, which involve whether
states can be sued without their consent, have also involved bipartisan
groups of AG aligned against the United States' position (Sossamon v.
Texas [2011]; Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart
[2011]).
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Other federalism-related issues have generated vertical-only
conflicts in the Supreme Court, such as whether state action is
immune from federal antitrust law (North Carolina Board of Dental
Examiners v. FTC [cert. granted]) and whether a state can refuse to
transfer a prisoner to the custody of the United States (Chafee v.
United States [cert. denied]). The United States and a bipartisan group
of AGs also disputed the proper interpretation of a federal civil rights
statute in the context of employment discrimination (University of
Texas Medical Center v. Nassar [2013]).

Areas Involving Intergovernmental Cooperation
While vertical and horizontal AG conflicts have grown
increasingly prominent throughout the Obama Administration,
intergovernmental cooperation remains important. Indeed, over half
(56 percent) of the cases from 2009 to 2013 involved neither vertical
nor horizontal conflict, though only 36 percent of the cases in 2013 fell
into this category.
The largest area of intergovernmental cooperation involved
criminal procedure issues. This area is consistently the single largest
issue area attracting multistate AG participation, as about a quarter of
all of the cases each year from 1993 through 2013 have involved
criminal procedure issues. In addition, these cases have involved the
least amount of AG conflict. AG participation in criminal procedure
cases tends to be bipartisan, and participating AGs rarely oppose the
federal government's position in these cases. Of all the cases
designated by the U.S. Supreme Court Database as "Criminal
Procedure" cases, only about 9 percent involved either partisan AG
participation or direct conflicts among federal and state prosecutors.
Even this small percentage likely overstates conflict, however, since
the Supreme Court Database includes Second Amendment gun rights
cases as part of this general category. Removing these cases from the
total drops the amount of conflict to less than 7 percent of the cases.
In addition to the cooperation present in criminal procedure
cases, AGs have also worked on a bipartisan basis to defend their own
ability to bring litigation in the name of their states. In Mississippi v.
AU Optronics [2014], nearly all of the nation's AGs signed on to a brief
supporting Mississippi AG Jim Hood's antitrust lawsuit against several
electronics manufacturers. Hood had filed the lawsuit in state court,
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but the manufacturers argued that the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 (CAFA) required that the AG's lawsuit be removed to federal
court. The AGs' ultimately successful argument was that CAFA was not
meant to limit consumer protection lawsuits filed by AGs. The AGs'
cooperation in AU Optronics mirrored previous bipartisan AG efforts to
fight attempts to limit their powers to litigate in the name of their
state, both in the Supreme Court (Cuomo v. Clearing House
Association [2009]) and in other venues.12 Bipartisan cooperation in
this area contrasts with the previously mentioned partisan conflict
among AGs when the issues involve the ability of private litigants to
sue.
Finally, while this article focuses on AG participation in Supreme
Court cases, it is important to note that out-of-court settlements with
national corporations have also tended to attract strong bipartisan
support from most or all of the nation's AGs. In addition to the $26
billion foreclosure settlement noted earlier, AGs have reached dozens
of consumer protection and antitrust settlements with pharmaceutical
companies, financial firms, and others (Provost 2010; Nolette
forthcoming).
The existence of intergovernmental cooperation in these areas,
however, does not necessarily mean that partisan concerns are
irrelevant. Of the sixty-three criminal procedure cases during the
Obama Administration involving a multistate brief, for example, a
Republican AG served as the lead author of the brief in forty-three (68
percent) cases. This is consistent with previous scholarship finding that
Republican AGs were more likely to initiate amicus briefs in criminal
procedure cases between 1990 and 2001 (Provost 2011), suggesting
that criminal procedure issues continue to be a higher priority for
Republican AGs. Further, even when they ultimately join legal
settlements with corporations, Republican AGs may be more likely to
harbor concerns about the impact of this litigation on business
interests. Republican Oklahoma AG Scott Pruitt, for example, initially
criticized the 2012 national foreclosure settlement as "greatly
overreach[ing] the authority of state attorneys general" (Oklahoma
Office of the Attorney General 2012). Previous scholarship on tobacco
litigation, which found that Republican AGs were more hesitant to join
the litigation out of concerns about its impact on the tobacco industry
(Spill, Licari, and Ray 2001), suggests that Pruitt's concern is not an
isolated one.
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Partisan Conflict and the Definition of "State Interests"
The existence of vertical and horizontal AG conflict is not an
entirely new development. AGs took on a more regularized and
coordinated activist role during the Reagan Administration by
challenging the administration's priorities on environmental, consumer
protection, and antitrust issues (Clayton 1994). Partisan splits were
apparent in several cases during the George W. Bush Administration,
including the litigation campaign by former New York AG Eliot Spitzer
and other Democratic AGs to force the Bush Administration to address
climate change (Massachusetts v. EPA [2007]).
Nevertheless, in addition to the intensification of these conflicts,
two new developments are particularly worth highlighting. First,
Republican AGs have become particularly active in initiating challenges
to federal policy. In one sense, this is not particularly surprising – after
all, Democratic AGs aggressively challenged the Bush Administration in
several policy areas, and Republican AGs now have the opportunity to
push back against an administration of the opposite party.
Nevertheless, it is notable that compared to the last time a Democrat
occupied the White House, Republican AGs are now far more active in
challenging the federal government and pursuing agendas quite
different from their Democratic counterparts. In nearly all of the cases
(96 percent) in which Republican AGs took positions opposing the
Clinton Administration, they did so as part of a bipartisan AG coalition.
In fact, of all of the partisan briefs AGs filed during the Clinton
Administration, most involved Democratic AGs taking a position
opposing the administration. Only five cases during the entire Clinton
Administration featured multiple Republican AGs collaborating on a
partisan brief,13 compared to forty-nine during the first five years of
the Obama Administration alone. Following a 2012 press conference of
nine Republican AGs who highlighted their various lawsuits against the
Obama Administration, Texas AG Greg Abbott remarked, "There seems
to be, in addition to the size, an intensified cohesion and collegiality
among the [Republican] AGs. Part of it is based on personality. Part of
it is based on sense of purpose" (Biskupic 2012). These statistics bear
out Abbott's comment.
A second important development has been AGs defining their
states' interests in increasingly partisan terms, leaving fewer cases in
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which there are clearly discernible and unified "state interests"
conflicting with those of the federal government. Instead, AGs have
alternated between broadly describing "state interests" as either the
necessity of protecting state policy autonomy or upholding the
interests of their individual citizens against government (state or
federal) overreach, depending on the nature of the underlying policy
dispute. The lack of consistency in these arguments suggests that AGs
are using their structural independence and nearly exclusive control of
over shaping their state's position in litigation to pursue their own, and
increasingly partisan, conceptions of good public policy.
Consider AGs' involvement in several recent high profile cases in
the Supreme Court. In Hollingsworth v. Perry and U.S. v. Windsor, two
prominent gay rights cases decided in 2013, separate Democratic and
Republican AG coalitions filed amicus briefs taking an opposite position
from one another. While both groups of AGs claimed that their status
as their states' legal representatives gave them an interest in these
cases, the AGs' respective positions appeared to be more about the
policy merits of the cases and less about federalism. While
Massachusetts AG Martha Coakley and her fellow Democratic AGs
argued in Windsor that the federal Defense of Marriage Act "represents
an unprecedented intrusion into an area of law that has always been
controlled by the states," she simultaneously led a Democratic
coalition in Hollingsworth urging a federal court to intervene and strike
down California's Proposition 8 banning same-sex marriages
(Massachusetts Attorney General's Office 2013). Meanwhile, a
Republican AG coalition claimed that striking down Proposition 8 would
"undermine the ability of states to define and regulate marriage" (Brief
of Indiana, et al. 2013a), but on the same day many of the same
Republican AGs filed a brief in Windsor defending a federal statute
regulating an area of family law that had traditionally been under state
control (Brief of Indiana, et al. 2013b).
Recent cases concerning abortion, gun control, and affirmative
action illustrates a similar dynamic of AGs taking positions in favor of
limiting state policymaking authority. In McCullen v. Coakley, a
challenge to Massachusetts's thirty-five foot "buffer zone" around
abortion clinics, twelve Republican AGs filed an amicus brief urging the
Court to strike down the state law because the law "exempts speakers
likely to express favorable views about abortion" (Brief of Michigan, et
al. 2013). Similarly, a group of AGs urged the Court to strike down a
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local law in McDonald v. Chicago (2010), involving a challenge to
Chicago's strict gun control law. Their interest in the case, they
claimed, flowed from the AGs' status as fundamental "guardians of
their citizens' constitutional rights" (emphasis added). The AGs, in
other words, advocated for increased federal authority over state
policymaking, all in the name of ensuring that "millions of Americans"
are not "deprived of their Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms" (Brief of Texas, et al. 2009). This trend of AGs arguing in favor
of a result that would effectively constrain state authority has also
appeared in recent cases such as Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, which featured a group of Democratic AGs opposing
Michigan AG Bill Schuette's defense of the state's constitutional ban on
affirmative action (Brief of California, et al. 2013).
This dynamic is also at work behind another recent trend of AGs
refusing to defend their own state laws against constitutional attack.
Texas AG Greg Abbott's refusal to defend his state's affirmative action
policy before the Supreme Court in Fisher v. University of Texas is one
example. Other recent examples include Pennsylvania's AG declining
to defend the state's Voter ID law on appeal (Murphy 2014) and the
California AG's decision to refrain from defending the state's ban on
gay marriage (Office of the California Attorney General 2013). After
taking office following conservative AG Ken Cuccinelli's failed bid for
Virginia's governorship, Democratic AG Mark Herring announced that
federal courts ought to strike down his own state's gay marriage ban
(Williams and Gabriel 2014). Several observers, including other AGs,
have criticized these "litigation vetoes" as examples of AGs allowing
ideological concerns to trump constitutional duties to defend state laws
(Suthers 2014).
The increasing polarization of AG activism has also been
apparent in growing conflicts between AGs and other state institutions.
Beginning shortly after AGs initiated the ACA challenges in federal
district court, for example, several governors and state legislatures
attempted to influence their AGs' decisions either to join or refrain
from joining the ongoing litigation. Idaho's state legislature became
the first of several to pass legislation purporting to require the AG to
file a lawsuit against the ACA (J. Miller 2010), and the Georgia
legislature even introduced articles of impeachment against the state's
Democratic AG for refusing to join the litigation (Brown 2010). The
Republican governors of Nevada and Mississippi both announced that
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they were hiring special outside counsel to represent their states after
their states' Democratic AGs had declined to do so (Wheeler 2010).
Meanwhile, Democratic legislators criticized their states' Republican
AGs for joining the challenge to the ACA. In Washington State, for
example, the Democratic legislature moved to reduce Republican AG
Rob McKenna's budget (Brunner 2010) and Seattle's city attorney
initiated a lawsuit seeking to force McKenna's withdrawal from the
litigation (La Corte 2010).

The Sources of Intensifying AG Polarization
What has contributed to the intensification of polarization
among the AGs? Why have Republican AGs, who as a group were
relatively muted the last time that a Democratic occupied the White
House, taken on more activist roles? Below, I suggest four key
contributions to these trends.
First, and most directly, AG activism reflects intensifying
polarization apparent elsewhere in the political system. While
polarization increased after Republicans captured control of Congress
in 1994, there has been a considerable surge in polarization since
2000 (Pew Research Center 2012). This intensified polarization
throughout the political regime has affected various institutions of
government, including the Supreme Court (Clayton and McMillan
2012). State governments have been no exception, as state-level
political conflicts increasingly mirror national-level partisan splits. As
late as George W. Bush's second term, one could speak of a distinction
between the polarized national environment and a less polarized statelevel politics (Krane 2007). Reflecting a similar development among
governors and other state-level institutions, however, the polarization
on the national level appears to have trickled down to the AGs.
Second, while groups of mostly Democratic AGs had challenged
national-level policies adopted by Republicans during the Reagan and
George H.W. Bush administrations, activism among Democratic AGs
reached new heights at the end of the 1990s and into the 2000s. This,
in turn, spurred Republican AGs to counter-mobilize. The key event
was the tobacco litigation of the late 1990s, which was initiated by
liberal AGs such as Louisiana's Michael Moore and Minnesota's Hubert
Humphrey.14 All of the nation's Republican AGs eventually joined
settlements with the tobacco industry, but not without criticism. Most
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prominent among the critics was Republican Alabama AG William
Pryor, who charged that the tobacco litigation was an illegitimate
attempt to achieve "regulation through litigation" (Pryor 2001). Shortly
after the tobacco settlement, Pryor helped establish the Republican
Attorneys General Association (RAGA). Democrats then founded the
Democratic Attorneys General Association in 2002, which, like RAGA,
serves not only as a way to elect more party members but also as a
forum to discuss partisan policy priorities. This development was a
significant departure from AGs' traditional practice of meeting only
under the auspices of the National Association of Attorneys General
and regional non-partisan groups (Curriden 1999). This development
mirrors similar trends on the state level, where the Republican and
Democratic Governors Associations have become increasingly
important relative to the bipartisan National Governor's Association
(Balz 2013).
The third major development contributing to intensifying
polarization among the AGs is that Republicans have had much more
success in AG elections. Democrats had long dominated this position at
the state level, maintaining a significant majority of the AG positions
for several decades.15 The Democrats' high point followed the 1992
elections when they held thirty-eight of the fifty AG positions, but the
party continued to hold a strong majority of the nation's AG seats
throughout the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations. Since the
start of the Obama Administration, however, Republican AGs have
seen an influx of new members to their ranks. Reflecting the broader
decline of divided partisan control of political institutions on the state
level (Kurtz 2013), Republicans began winning AG elections in
relatively conservative states long represented by Democratic AGs.
Following Louisiana AG Buddy Caldwell's switch to the Republican Party
in early 2011, Democrats no longer held a majority of the AG seats for
the first time in decades.
A fourth development is AGs' increasing willingness to
collaborate on lawsuits with ideological interest groups. Republican
AGs' ACA lawsuits, for example, operated in tandem with several
lawsuits by private employers and conservative advocacy groups
(Goldstein 2011). The National Federation of Independent Business
held a press conference in Florida AG Bill McCollum's office announcing
that the conservative "voice of small business" was joining the AGs'
lawsuit in May 2010 (Sack 2010). One of the conservative litigators
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the states retained to represent their interests in their challenge to the
ACA, David Rivkin, has served as outside counsel to conservative AGs
on other cases challenging the Obama Administration as well (Price
2011). Republican AGs' use of outside counsel mirrors Democratic AGs'
alliances with liberal advocacy groups and private class-action
attorneys in litigation aimed at influencing national policy.
Massachusetts's lead brief in Massachusetts v. EPA, which was
authored by Georgetown Law professor and environmental advocate
Lisa Heinzerling, came together only after close collaboration among
representatives of the twenty-nine state and environmental advocacy
group plaintiffs aligned against the EPA (Nugent 2007). AGs have also
worked in tandem with a coalition of various unions, progressive
advocacy groups, and class action attorneys in litigation seeking
greater regulation of pharmaceutical companies (Nolette forthcoming).
The alliances among ideological litigators and AGs reflects the
broader polarization that has occurred in the legal arena, particularly
as conservatives have exhibited greater willingness and capacity to
use the courts to achieve conservative social policy goals (Teles 2010).
It also reflects the benefits of collaboration for both sides. For the AGs,
collaborating with outside groups helps the states expand the
resources available to engage in lengthy, large-scale litigation
campaigns. In the ACA case, for example, the NFIB served as a
valuable litigation ally for the AGs, providing significant resources for
the lawsuit. The organization's financial records indicated that it spent
nearly $1.2 million on the lawsuit in 2010 alone (Needleman and Loten
2012). These collaborations also benefit the AGs' advocacy group and
private litigator allies in part because AG participation helps add
legitimacy and publicity to the political concerns underlying their
litigation. The AG coalition aligned against the ACA, for example,
brought considerable institutional authority to the litigation. Because
they could claim that the ACA implicated state interests, AGs also
brought another valuable resource along with them: the ability to get
into court. In this sense, collaborating with AGs grants advocacy
groups easier entry to court by adding an element of standing that
they alone may not be able to claim.
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Conclusion
The analysis in this article suggests that the rise of polarized
politics elsewhere in the political system has been apparent in AG
activism as well. Vertical and horizontal AG conflicts reached
unprecedented levels during the Obama Administration as percolating
challenges to federal policies reached the Supreme Court. This level of
conflict is likely to continue for the remainder of Obama's presidency
as several pending challenges reach the Court, such as a significant
AG-led challenge to the Dodd-Frank financial regulations (Witkowski
2013).
Scholars have paid greater attention to AGs in light of their
recent activism, but several potential avenues for work on these
important state-level actors remain. While this article focuses on AG
interventions in the U.S. Supreme Court, examining other AG activities
would help get a more comprehensive picture of trends in AG decisionmaking. AGs play an important role in state policy development, such
as issuing opinions interpreting state law and providing guidance to
state agencies. They also attempt to influence the judicial branch in
state and lower federal courts, and have sought to influence Congress
and the federal executive branch through organized sign-on letters
and methods besides litigation. Further examining these areas of AG
cooperation and conflict can serve to shed light on the nature of "state
interests" in contemporary American federalism. Scholars might also
examine the extent to which AGs are polarized relative to the
electorates they represent, building upon existing work in this area
pertaining to AGs and state-level actors generally (Provost 2010; Lax
and Phillips 2011).
Three additional areas of inquiry would be particularly fruitful.
First, we know that AG litigation can have an important impact on
national policy, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court adopting the
AGs' Medicaid arguments in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012). Future work
might build upon existing studies of AGs' impact on national policy
(Waltenburg and Swinford 1999; Nicholson-Crotty 2007) to examine
how AG activism has shaped American political development. Second,
the emergence of collaborations between AGs and private ideological
interest groups appears to be a particularly important trend. This
article suggests that both AGs and interest groups benefit from these
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collaborations, but little is known about how AGs have actually worked
with private groups in their litigation campaigns.
Finally, more work ought to explore AGs' institutional
development over time. Previous scholarship has noted the rapid
increase in AG capacity and professionalization among AGs beginning
in the 1970s (Waltenburg and Swinford 1999). More recently, several
AGs have established solicitor general positions in their offices in order
to assist in appellate litigation. A majority of AGs now have solicitor
general offices, most of which were added in the late 1990s and into
the 2000s (B. Miller 2010). Further, Congress has contributed to AGs'
development by providing grants for state-level enforcement and
allowing AGs to enforce federal law (Lemos 2011). Closer examination
of these contributions to AGs' institutional development can shed light
on why AGs have become such an important political player on the
national stage, and may help to explain patterns of activism that have
emerged in contemporary AG practice.
AGs have few incentives to abandon the use of collaborative
litigation as a way to influence national policy. Multistate litigation has
simultaneously been a way for AGs to collectively pursue a common
policy agenda and individually raise their own political profiles (Provost
2003; Kam 2012; Catanese 2013). The emergence of intensified
activism among Republican AGs, which followed in the footsteps of
Democratic AG activism during the George W. Bush Administration,
signals an entrenchment of collaborative AG litigation as an avenue for
partisan contestation. This suggests that these important state actors
will likely continue to engage in law-based activism well after Obama
leaves office.
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Figure 1 Number of multistate cases involving vertical conflicts, 1993-2013

Source: Author's calculations from data collected on Lexis-Nexis.
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Figure 2 Number of multistate cases involving horizontal conflicts, 19932013

Source: Author's calculations from data collected on Lexis-Nexis.

Table 1 Frequency of vertical and horizontal AG conflicts, 2009-2013

Vertical Conflict
Present
Present
18%
Not Present
17%

Horizontal Conflict
Not Present
9%
56%

Notes:
1

2

3

The governor appoints the AG in Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and Wyoming. The state legislature and state
supreme court appoint the AGs in Maine and Tennessee,
respectively.
For example, AGs from southern states litigated against several
federal civil rights policies during the 1960s (e.g. South Carolina
v. Katzenbach [1966]).
For example, out-of-court multistate settlements with corporations
are also a key way in which AGs can pursue political agendas.
AGs also engage in activism in other venues, including lobbying
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4

5

6

7

8

legislatures and issuing opinions guiding executive branch
interpretation of state law.
Just over half (51 percent) of these cases involved one or more AGs
serving as direct parties to the litigation, while the remainder
involved solely amicus participation. Note that this dataset does
not include cases involving participation from only one AG, since
single-state cases tend to involve state-specific issues different
from the more nationally important issues involved in multistate
cases. I also excluded the small handful of original jurisdiction
cases during these years. While these cases involve state
conflicts, they also typically involve only state-specific policy
issues (e.g. disputes over state borders). Nevertheless, because
of the small number of these original jurisdiction cases,
including them would make little difference to the trends
identified in Figure 2.
I used the following search string for each year of the study in order
to identify briefs filed by AGs: COUNSEL((attorney! w/2
general!) or (state! w/2 attorney!) or "Atty. Gen." or "Attorney
Gen." or "Atty. General" or "solicitor general") or (amici pre/1
plural(states)). Because the Lexis-Nexis database includes only
a limited number of briefs concerning petitions for certiorari in
cases that the Court ultimately declines to review, I
supplemented this search with a list of such cases provided by
the Supreme Court Counsel for the National Association of
Attorneys General, Dan Schweitzer.
Additionally, I treated two other sets of cases as only one for the
purposes of this analysis: (1) cases in which states filed
separate sets of briefs, but on the same side of the case, and
(2) cases involving the same legal question that were later
consolidated into a single case by the Court.
The vast majority of cases involved wide AGs participation. Over 96
percent of the cases in the dataset involved five or more AGs,
and over two-thirds attracted the involvement of at least fifteen
AGs.
I chose an 80 percent partisanship threshold because it provides the
best balance between cases attracting significant bipartisan
support and cases that might have attracted the support of one
or two AGs from the opposite party but were nevertheless
clearly partisan in nature. However, I also examined the data

Publius: the Journal of Federalism, Vol 44, No. 3 (Summer 2014): pg. 451-474. DOI. This article is © Oxford University
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Oxford University Press.

29

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

using a 70, 90, and 100 percent threshold to determine
partisanship. The trends using all of these thresholds were very
similar to those identified in Figures 1 and 2.
9
Vertical conflicts were present in sixty-eight and eighty-nine cases
during the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations,
respectively.
10
The seventy-five partisan cases during the Obama presidency
compares to sixty-six and eighty-six during the Clinton and
George W. Bush years, respectively. Direct horizontal conflicts
were present in eighteen and thirty-one cases during the two
preceding administrations.
11
The U.S. Supreme Court Database is available at
http://scdb.wustl.edu/ (accessed March 11, 2014).
12
For example, the National Association of Attorneys General
frequently organizes "sign-on letters" sent to Congress or the
executive branch, many of which urge policymakers not to
preempt AG powers to enforce state consumer protection and
antitrust laws. The list of sign-on letters is available at
http://www.naag.org/sign-on_archive.php (accessed March 11,
2014).
13
The five cases were Romer v. Evans (1996) (gay rights), United
States v. Virginia (1996) (sex discrimination), Printz v. United
States (1997) (whether Congress can require state officials to
regulate handgun purchases), Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v.
Shanklin (2000) (whether federal law preempts state-level
private tort claims), and Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board (2000) (involving the contested 2000 presidential
election).
14
Four AGs, including Moore and Humphrey, reached individual state
settlements with the tobacco industry separate from the fortysix state Master Settlement Agreement in 1998.
15
Between 1980 and 1994, Democrats controlled no fewer than thirtyone AG positions. Apart from dropping to twenty-nine seats for
two years after the 1994 elections, Democrats continued to
control at least thirty seats every year until 2005.
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